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Abstract: We are grateful to all the commentators who engaged with our target article. Some
commentators have offered important insights into our proposed design and methods for
legally intervening on behalf of futurity. Others have focused on theoretical considerations
central to our proposal for multispecies justice and trusteeship. All have inspired
modifications and further elaboration of our initial proposal. In this Response, we engage
with the commentaries, integrating their suggestions, striving for convergence and
complementarity, but also discussing points of divergence with our proposed framework
where necessary. There is substantial overlap in the points of view of the three co-authors,
but there are also differences. Section 1 is more reflective of the views of AT and Section 2 is
more reflective of the views of FJS-A and WL.
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We wish to thank all twenty-five of our commentators for engaging with our target article,
“Just Preservation” (hereafter, JP). Whether we agree with you in full or in part, we
appreciate the insights you have shared with us as well as the obvious time and effort you
have invested in your commentaries. We hope we address them usefully in this Response,
and that the exchange helps further our collective feeling and reasoning on matters affecting
all sentient animals and the environments we share.
As we finalize this Response, multiple crises have swept the globe and this necessarily
changes the flavor of our Response. The Sars-CoV-2 virus and the Covid-19 pandemic it
sparked have their roots in injustice in humanity’s relationship with nature (Wiebers &
Feigin, 2020; Treves, 2020). The severe mishandling of these crises in some countries has
resulted in tens of thousands of needless deaths, revealing inadequate investment in public
health and infrastructure, inadequate policies and insufficient inter- and intra-governmental
cooperation on matters of health and social well-being.
All this is brought into sharp relief by recent pandemics, including Covid-19. These
have largely originated through the zoonotic transfer of disease because of habitat
destruction, the bushmeat trade, intensive animal agriculture, and wet markets (Karesh,
Cook, Bennett, & Newcomb, 2005; Wiebers & Feigin, 2020). The notion that in this crisis only
humans deserve our care and that other animals and nature should take a back seat is based
on a false choice. The need to act justly and compassionately for the sake of all life has never
been tested so explicitly as it is today.
Reintegrating ourselves into a more-than-human moral community and remedying
our history of planetary destruction has never been more urgent. Our moral community’s
current dire condition is not bad luck but the consequence of bad decision-making. The aim
of our target article on just preservation was to help rectify exploitative human decisions
and reduce the consequent injustices for people, nonhuman animals, and nature.
Summary of Just Preservation (JP)
Despite the tragedies and uncertainties, we feel encouraged by the number of commentaries
on JP and the consensus that our planet’s environmental crisis is real (as nicely summarized
by Kopnina and by Lambert). For those less familiar with the content of our target article - and because we feel that a few of our commentators may not have fully appreciated the
most important points we were making, -- we quote below from the Abstract and Discussion
(Treves, Santiago-Ávila, & Lynn, 2019a,b):
“We argue that the interests and well-being of non-humans, youth, and future generations of
both human and non-human beings (futurity) have too long been ignored in consensus-based,
anthropocentric conservation. Consensus-based stakeholder-driven processes disadvantage
those absent or without a voice and allow current adult humans and narrow, exploitative
interests to dominate decisions about the use of nature over its preservation for futurity of all
life. We propose that authentically non-anthropocentric worldviews that incorporate
multispecies justice are needed for a legitimate, deliberative, and truly democratic process of
adjudication between competing interests in balancing the preservation and use of nature.
Legitimate arenas for such adjudication would be courts that can defend intergenerational
equity.… We urge practitioners and scholars to … embrace a more comprehensive worldview
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that grants future life on earth fair representation in humanity's decisions and actions today.”
(p.134)
“We advocate several fundamental changes to how decisions are made to preserve nature for
futurity and use or allocate nature to current adults. We do not propose that every decision be
decided by a separate court procedure. Each branch of government has a distinct trustee duty,
which when properly exercised could prevent endless adjudication. But we do recommend that
the differences between essential human needs that might justify use (e.g., annual harvest of
timber or vital subsistence use of animals) be distinguished from the trivial human needs that
seem ascendant today…, and that non-human needs, including those of individuals, be
considered equitably alongside those… Yet, executive agencies in the U.S. and Canada appear
to make such decisions routinely and then face costly, time-consuming, and bitter challenges
on statutory and regulatory grounds against standards of administrative procedures that bear
little or no relationship to trustee duties…” (p. 140, internal citations omitted).

An important clarification to make at this juncture is that we are not advocating nonhuman
rights per se in JP. This is in part because as coauthors we ourselves take different positions
on the question. Several of our commentators, however, misunderstood us:
Bergstrom writes, “I would argue a much more salutary strategy for the sake of Gaia
is to freeze and then roll back human population growth rather than grant full civil rights to
all non-human individuals.” We are puzzled that this usually meticulous reader and writer so
misunderstood our argument. Whereas we do agree on the importance of addressing human
population growth, this is an additional consideration, not a substitute for the ones we wrote
about. JP is not a plea for civil rights for nonhumans.
Washington writes “For [the authors of JP] the rights of individual introduced species
over-rule the rights of native species and ecosystems. I do not believe this is part of a 'just' ethic”.
This suggests that we have adopted a belief in individual animal rights or in priority of one
taxon over another.
We point out these two misunderstandings to clarify the difference between granting
rights to nonhumans and granting legal standing to advocates on behalf of nonhumans. We
also note, however, that the choice between denying or granting abstract ‘rights’ to
nonhumans represents a false and simplistic dichotomy that blinkers thinking and leads to
caricatures and stereotyping.
The commentaries quoted above made us think of the wise (and, to us, novel)
summary of research on stereotypes by Sevillano. Those who care for animals span a
continuum of beliefs and value judgments, so mischaracterizing them all as one category of
animal rights activists seems an unrepresentative stereotype. We draw our readers'
attention to how we three co-authors differ on the issue of rights and legal standing for
animals, yet we were able to converge on a method for improving justice. We counsel all
readers to set aside stereotypes regarding human values in relation to animals and to weigh
carefully the design of interventions.
In reviewing the commentaries, we identified two broad concerns. One is practical:
about whether our proposed remedy for just preservation through the legal system is
adequate and feasible. The other concern is theoretical, about our conceptualization of
multispecies justice. We start with the practical considerations first (section 1), as our
intention with JP was to offer pragmatic suggestions for doing right by futurity. This is
followed by section 2, on theoretical and ethical considerations.
3
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1. Practical Considerations
(largely by Adrian Treves)

Our commentators offer important insights into our proposed design and methods for legally
intervening on behalf of futurity. These commentaries have inspired a few modifications to
our proposal.
1.1 Trustees. An important aspect of trusteeship that we under-emphasized is pointed out
by Baker. Ethics is an indispensable component of trusteeship. For example, courts often
hold trustees to the ‘prudent man standard’ (Sagarin & Turnipseed, 2012), which expects
trustees to behave toward beneficiaries as parties with interests that the trustees have the
moral obligation to protect and sustain. Bosselmann (2017) and Treves et al. (2017)
reminded us that future trustees responsible for the well-being of the planet have duties of
selflessness, utmost transparency, and accountability to their beneficiaries. In JP we
extended this by considering within-state trusteeship codified in the constitutional courts.
The moral obligations of trustees apply to JP because the selection and constant testing of
the representativeness of trustees is not only a professional but a personal ethic. Indeed,
Washington argues that trustees need training in justice (see also Santiago-Ávila, Lynn, &
Treves, 2018; Treves et al., 2017).
Spiegel’s insights are particularly important and helpful. Concerning the life-anddeath decisions made in extremis by health care professionals with critically ill patients,
Spiegel points out that our deliberative process and our call for testing trustees may be too
slow. In some cases, we need a cadre of experts trained in ethics who can make decisions
about emergency interventions quickly, without a court that pits equal advocates against
each other in a slow judicial process. We agree; the history and practice of biomedical ethics
-- Spiegel’s own tradition and practice of scholarship -- is an important model to learn from.
We note, however, that our remedy is aimed at combating the slow drain on
nonhumans and futurity over years and decades and centuries; so the analogy with
preventive public health interventions might be especially apt. The ethical allocation of
nature’s assets first to preservation and second to use could be a branch of biomedical ethics
itself (emphasizing the bio part of this ethical reasoning more than the medical).
Critiquing our vision of constitutional courts, Palmer & Fischer argue that the courts
are too slow, too beholden to legislatures and executive branches (in the US context anyway),
and that the interests at stake are too diverse: “It is hence unlikely that trying to represent all
these interests would allow the broad consensus needed for political action of any kind, much
less global political action.” We agree with this concern in some respects. It is important to
recall that our suggestion for judicial advocates is a hypothetical example of how we might
represent the well-being of futurity in deliberations over resource allocation. Judicial
procedures are meant to be deliberative, so as not to rush to judgement. This is an ideal not
realized in many instances, especially when invidious prejudices (e.g., classism, racism,
sexism, speciesism, ableism, anthropocentrism) are among the latent presuppositions of the
participants. Advocates contesting such prejudices are even more important in such
circumstances.
Trustees must certainly be installed throughout government and not just the courts.
Trustees must also be granted the type of independence that makes them resistant to the
whims of elected officials. Examples would be removal only for cause, terms that straddle
4
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those of elected officials of the executive and legislative branch of government, and strict
codes of conduct.
We do not share Palmer & Fischer’s skepticism about transnational agreements on
trusteeship or about diversity within and among nations. The myth of consensus in policy
decision-making has been thoroughly critiqued and that myth should not guide us here
(Peterson et al. 2005). On the contrary, diversity of opinion is inherent to our proposal for
just preservation. It is the independence of the trustees that is essential, not consensus. The
only intervention that might need widespread consensus is to enforce constitutions, and to
amend them if needed, so that current and future publics, including nonhumans, win
permanent legal standing in a powerful environmental court (see Dowe & Chmait).
A number of commentators express concern about the role of the trustees. We
acknowledge that this was under-developed in JP because we were waiting for the resolution
of Juliana v USA (2016), an atmospheric trust litigation case playing out in U.S. federal courts
at the time we wrote it. That case was relevant because James Hansen was listed among the
plaintiffs as “future generations, through their Guardian Dr. James Hansen” (Powell 2019).
Although Hansen was not an advocate arguing in court as we envision for the trustees in JP,
we hoped to learn from that case and his privileged position. However, Juliana v USA was
decided in favor of the U.S. government in the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, so the role of James
Hansen as guardian of future generations was not ultimately tested in that decision (Juliana
v USA2020) (Reed 2020). Perhaps 2021 will reveal whether the plaintiffs will appeal to the
U.S. Supreme court and whether the U.S. government under the Biden administration settles
out of court as we would encourage it to do.
In Hanson’s petition and briefs as plaintiff, the guardian’s role was not prominent
either (Blumm and Wood 2017), probably because the U.S. government was the trustee
being taken to court. By contrast, the constitutional environmental court we envision in JP
to adjudicate claims about using or preserving nature from use would have been
precautionary rather than accusatory, in the sense that the court would weigh competing
claims (controversies) rather than injuries (cases). Hence our scheme in the U.S. context
would first require an Act of U.S. Congress to create courts with such powers and to formalize
the roles of advocates. This is not unlike current state fish and wildlife commissions, except
that, unlike in current commissions, the strictures of the U.S. Public Trust Doctrine and
formalized roles of multiple advocates would actually be enforced (Blumm and Paulsen
2013; Blumm et al. 2014). This enforcement would be a novel addition. How then would
advocates who serve as trustees of current adult humans, future generations of all life, and
current nonhumans be chosen and trained to argue in such courts?
We will summarize here the ethical codes of conduct of such advocate-trustees, as
derived from the writings of Horner (2000) and Wood (2009, 2014) on environmental
trustees and the general attributes of fiduciary trustees. We will then contemplate how one
individual advocate-trustee might be challenged by another one, or by the beneficiaries of
the trust. The ethical code of conduct of such trustees would place priority on selflessness
because they would necessarily be adult humans and hence not personally or professionally
invested in the wins and losses of future generations, human or nonhuman. The selflessness
that would be required is not instinctive to humans; but we think it could be cultivated.
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Selflessness should be paired with incorruptibility, transparency, and accountability
to the beneficiaries of the trust, which all seem of an importance equal or near-equal to that
of selflessness. Moreover, if there were breaches of such ethics, the only ones who could hold
the wayward advocate-trustee to account for correction or replacement would be other
current humans (and potentially youth, through demonstrations, civil disobedience, etc.).
There is a circularity that adult humans currently seem feeble in self-policing. The usual
human processes of consensus-building, majority voting, and impeachment proceedings
may all be inadequate when the real constituency cannot speak, vote, or enforce their own
wishes. The care for protected populations, such as children and incapacitated humans,
seems the clearest model for the care such trustees would need to exercise.
A strict set of rules of conduct must be created; impartiality must be generated
through explicit accounting imposed not on a single adult human but on an entire corps of
trustee-advocates representing every pertinent constituency. For example, there is currently
a structure in the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) species survival
groups in which entire committees are devoted to observing and inferring the status of a
given taxon of beings (usually species but sometimes subspecies or even populations).
Currently these representatives are chosen for scientific expertise and asked only to weigh
evidence and synthesize various parameters leading to a single categorical rating of
conservation status. Such scientific backgrounds or the ability to call upon them would be
necessary attributes of the advocate-trustees we envision, but observational and inferential
scientific expertise alone would be insufficient.
In addition, the advocate-trustees would need an executive decision-making ability
and legal expertise to evaluate the proposed use and preservation policies under
consideration in a given controversy. The advocate-trustees would also require expertise in
ethical decision-making -- or the ability to call upon it -- to arbitrate between conflicting
claims within their constituency. There is not the space in this Response to expand on the
ethical decision-making skills or legal expertise our proposal will require so we turn to the
within-constituency conflicts of interest next.
Some demands by current humans to use nature may benefit some species and harm
others, support or harm future generations, or affect some current humans positively and
others negatively. Hence each proposed use or preservation calls for a balancing act by the
individual advocate-trustees on behalf of their diverse constituencies. For example, the
decision to hunt wolves (or to challenge an existing hunting system) would pit current adult
human groups against each other, such as the Ojibwe tribal governments against the largely
Euro-American, male carnivore-hunters in Wisconsin (David 2009; Fergus and Hill 2019;
Shelley et al. 2011; Zorn 2012). We present a hypothetical example of the very different
demands each such current human group might make in Figure 1. Similar competing
interests might be analyzed and considered equitably for non-anthropocentric interests,
which would not play out quantitatively in terms of wolf-killing but qualitatively in terms of
individual, community, and aggregated biotic well-being and health. The caption of Figure 1
explains why a trustee-advocate would have to understand the science, the ethics of
decision-making, the law, and the competing interests within their constituency to balance
those interests and argue for their constituents as a whole.
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Figure 1. Schematic drawing of hypothetical competing interests between two current adult human
groups. These are just two of the current adult human groups that have an interest. LEFT: The
Wisconsin approach represents state government policy as of 2020 with a population goal at 350
wolves (green), the remainder of the wolves being allocated only to wolf-killing interests, i.e., private
citizens hunters, trappers, and livestock owners via permits (blue). RIGHT: The Intergenerational
Equity (IGE) approach is a hypothetical one in which the legacy of 815 wolves transferred from the
U.S. federal government to the state and tribes in 2012 would be defined as the principal for future
generations (green). Then federal treaty rights negotiated with Ojibwe nations grant equal authority
(orange). Finally, current users would be allocated only half of the interest on the principal (narrow
blue slice) equaling half of annual growth. The competition would be over how many wolves to
preserve (green) and how many to use (blue). This debate is highly anthropocentric and includes
trivial human desires such as recreation (wolf-hunters Treves & Martin. 2011; Santiago-Ávila et al.
2018) and intangible interests such as spiritual preferences (Ojibwe traditionalists, David 2009,
Shelley et al. 2011, Fergus & Hill 2019) respectively, without acknowledging the interests of the
wolves. Although this hypothetical example is largely between competing adult human interests it
remains unjust for nonhumans.

Current wolves who might be hunted and current deer who might be freed of some predators
by such a hunt would likely have competing interests in a wolf-hunt that the advocatetrustee could weigh as competing claims. The trustee-advocate(s) for futurity (we remain
agnostic about how many independent parties there should be, but probably 1 or 2 such
trustee-advocates) might find that youths, future wolves, future deer, and other “persons” of
future ecosystems differ to a greater or lesser degree in their preferred terms for a future
wolf-hunt. In each case, the appropriate trustee-advocates would need to weigh ethical
considerations about responsibility, needs, and deserts (e.g. as articulated by Santiago-Avila
et al. 2018) addressing current wolf management policies in Wisconsin. The number of
interests would neither be infinite, nor should the trustee-advocate spend too much time and
effort deliberating on the interests of actors who are minimally affected by the proposed
human use. The number is not infinite because any human use proposal would be restricted
to a defined context, decision and jurisdiction, and hence the ecosystem sets the upper limit
on the number of species affected. The particular nonhumans most strongly affected by the
proposed human use should be definable by the strength of ecological interactions that affect
basic needs (survival, reproduction, well-being) rather than trivial desires and preferences.
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The challenges to our scheme are neither trivial, nor insurmountable. Our topic
clearly goes beyond the scope of what we can address in this Response, but we hope the
architecture of the system we propose will be found to be clearer and more just than the
current status quo and will give a voice to the interests of the voiceless.
1.2 Equity. The issue of trustees is addressed briefly with reference to the problematic
concept of stakeholders by Gupta, who makes the valid point that unequal power dynamics
will always interfere with a just distribution of resources. We suggest, however, that the
incremental progress toward greater justice is worth the effort: the perfect should not stand
in the way of the good.
Paradoxically, where Gupta seems to agree with us she misunderstands our
argument about the role of consensus. She thinks we are “advocating the idea of trustees as
advocates for non-human nature in consensus building scenarios.” She adds that “multiple
stakeholders need to be part of a consensus-building process.” We acknowledge that in specific
situations one should try to build consensus (e.g., for joint action among those with shared
visions) and that consensus can be powerful within interest groups. Reaching consensus,
however, depends either on relatively equal power relations or on considerations for others’
well-being transcending and sometimes going counter to the interests of the more powerful.
These presuppositions are not often met.
Our proposal in JP is aimed at balancing the power inequities between interest groups
that will never reach consensus because of competing interests, conflicting visions, or failure
to take into account voices that cannot be heard at all because they are not human or not yet
born. Hence, our emphasis is on advocacy in adversarial debates. Overall, however, we avoid
the word “stakeholder” because “stakes” either intentionally or unintentionally connote
exclusive claims to land, financial assets, or other living beings. When one assigns priority to
preservation, as we have done, all life has a stake. The word stakeholder has legitimized all
sorts of unjust consensus practices in conservation (López-Bao, Chapron, & Treves, 2017).
We agree with Peterson et al. (2005) that consensus processes often marginalize minorities
and always marginalize the voiceless, such as nonhumans and futurity. JP is hence explicitly
not based on consensus but on adjudication between competing claims on an equal footing.
The need to place claims on an equal footing applies also to our argument for
individual consideration: Bergstrom suggests that populations and species deserve more
consideration than individuals because the extinction of species and the extirpation of
populations is worse than the death of an individual. We agree up to a point. It is not that
individuals deserve no consideration, as in the current status quo. In specific situations
individual interests might be subordinated (though not dismissed outright) in favor of the
interests of communities. But there is no a priori moral hierarchy that applies only to
nonhumans and not to humans.
Concerning the distinction between (1) considering individuals as part of their
aggregates such as communities and populations and (2) considering only populations and
species, JP points to the usual outcome: “conflicts between individual humans and individual
non-humans commonly face the rebuttal that ‘the collective is not jeopardized by action x, so
we can sacrifice the individual non-human for the benefits of action x’.” (p.138).
In this Response we expand the argument by analogy with a class action lawsuit.
Although individuals might win legal standing to sue, a class of affected individuals gains
8
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from their numbers without losing their individual legal standing: “Without perfect equality
of representation for humans and nonhumans and for current life and futurity, the voiceless
will always be discounted and thereby lose most debates over use and preservation.” (JP p. 140).
The whole should never be less than the sum of its parts if aggregation is just. The individual
nonhuman claim should not be devalued to less than one claim, otherwise the individual has
been deprived of full legal standing. In the status quo, individual nonhumans are routinely
devalued when humans decide to kill one nonhuman because the population (the class in
this case) is left alive. The decision to sacrifice an individual for the good of the community
has traditionally (for humans) been judged as individual constitutional rights to life and
liberty balanced against the societal good.
JP accordingly proposes that sacrificing an individual animal must be proven to
secure the good of the whole moral community balanced against the loss of individual life.
That rebalancing rules out trivial human justifications for killing individuals (such as
recreation, trophies, nuisance, etc.) and invalidates the common claim that it is alright to kill
one animal if the population is conserved. In the status quo, humans always win because
individual humans have legal standing in most jurisdictions. Failure to recognize individual
nonhuman claims has failed -- and will continue to fail -- to deliver justice.
1.3 Scope. , In reminding us about the devastation that human over-abundance on the planet
has wreaked, and will continue to do, several commentators (e.g., Kiley-Worthington) may
not have appreciated the scope of our proposal. We agree about the magnitude of the threat
of human overpopulation and perhaps also its priority. Yet we also note that it has long been
understood that the relative per capita consumption rate of different nations and the gap
between the use of nature by the wealthy and the poor may sometimes be as important, or
even moreso (Groom, Meffe, & Carroll, 2007). The problems of human over-population and
over-use of natural resources demand different interventions. Our purpose in JP is to redress
injustice in the preservation and use of nature. Our proposal would be compatible with
parallel and complementary efforts to slow human population growth or curb unequal
access to resources.
Palmer & Fischer present two examples of intervening in nature -- one for salmon
and one for geo-engineering the atmosphere to reduce greenhouse gas concentrations. The
first example is on point but the second is not about the use or preservation of nature’s
assets; rather, it is about an intervention to reverse damage. Such interventions are entirely
compatible with our quest for more just decisions about allocating nature to human use.
Palmer & Fischer and other commentators seem to view our proposal for just preservation
as a panacea, which makes it seem an impossibly heavy lift, not feasible in today’s politics,
and as one commentator put it, a greater threat to capitalism than the abolition of slavery
(Tiffin). Our intervention does threaten capitalistic profiteering to the extent that it
denounces exploitation and appropriation of nature, but it is not yet a means of ending all
damage to our planet.
1.4 Alternatives to Trustee-advocates. Several commentators offer very different
alternatives to our proposal about trustees. Although these proposals have merit, we do not
believe they are more feasible, effective, or realistic than ours.
Kiley-Worthington proposes a bill of rights for animals. This may be ideal if one
believes that animal rights are the solution to the problems of preservation and uses that
9
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harm futurity. Considering the long history of efforts to enforce human rights, we wonder if
an animal bill of rights would be any easier or more effective.
Gradidge & Zawisza write, “how anthropocentric speciesism can be overcome
becomes important. Yet this important issue is left unanswered.” They go on to advocate the
use of ambassador dogs. We agree that companion animals are a direct experience of nonhuman personhood and can bring joy and solace to our lives. The key to making ambassador
animals work, however, is to map the empathy and ethics of care developed in our
companion animal relationships over to other beings, species, and ecological communities.
That is a sizeable task and worthy of further discussion. It may indeed prove to be an effective
intervention for some humans. It is noteworthy, however, that the growth to one billion dogs
on the planet has taken place without regard for their potential impact on wild individuals
and communities (Treves, & Bonacic, 2016). Our domination of domestic animals may have
deluded us into thinking we can domesticate and manage the planet wisely. Ambassador
animals alone are not likely to be sufficient to reduce unjust and unsustainable use of
nonhumans as natural resources for human profit or unethical recreation.
Although we are duly impressed by the many achievements of Howard & Dyer in
raising the profile of bees in the public worldwide, we wonder whether that will translate
into interventions against unsustainable harvests, predator-killing contests, over-fishing,
etc. After all, bees are not eaten or hunted for sport today. Wolves have become extremely
controversial, and pawns for political power plays between interest groups. We think the
honeybee faces a political backlash if it is used for interventions more intrusive than calls
for lowering pollution by neonicotenoids (see also Danielson & Vonasch for how
conservative political opponents can frame even the charming bees as agents of liberal
infringement on economies and human rights). We hope Howard & Dyer are right that the
bees can charm the global public into treating other nonhumans with more consideration for
individuals.
It will certainly take a suite of practical action to achieve just preservation. We hope
our proposal is seen as resonant with other proposals, even if we differ over practical details
that will need to be worked out in concrete cases.
2. Multispecies justice, moral value and praxis

(largely by Francisco J. Santiago-Ávila & William Lynn)

In JP, we refer to an ethic of justice as an “ethical duty we owe towards other selves as centers
of experience”. Although we acknowledge the tensions between advancing justice for
individuals and ecological communities, we also state that justice for the latter has been the
focus of environmental and conservation ethics. To correct for this sometimes relative,
sometimes absolute dismissal of individuals (Midgley 1998), we suggest that any conception
of justice should include nonhuman individuals. Lynch & Blumstein misinterpret this as
limiting justice to individuals. A better multispecies justice framework is Midgley’s (1998;
2001) concept of a "mixed-community", in which there is no binary opposition between
individuals and the communities of which they are a part. Added to this is a geocentric
axiology recognizing the intrinsic value of people, animals and nature, as individuals and
communities, along with their accompanying social and ecological duties. This is a nonanthropocentric ethics uncoupling the concepts of ‘human ’and ‘social ’to account for more
10
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than simply ecological obligations (or ecological justice) towards nonhumans (Plumwood
1995, 2000; Calarco, 2014; Donaldson & Kymlicka, 2011).
Various commentators differ in their interpretation of who or what has moral value
and is deserving of justice. Correia Caeiro suggests an individualist account of moral value:
“individuals are more important than collectives” because they are centers of experience,
have needs, capabilities and relationships (social and ecological). We agree that these
considerations are important for deciding what we owe individuals. However, the argument
fails to address the reasons this makes individuals more important than communities. The
individualism that considers organisms as separate units forced to interact for their survival
may be a metaphysical trap feeding this individual-community dualism and the resulting
hierarchy (see Derrida, 1991; Midgley, 1995; Slicer, 1991; Calarco 2014). To paraphrase
Midgley (2001, pp. 27-29), parts and wholes are equally real, despite the duties we owe each
different being, be this an individual or a community.
Building on this focus on individuals, Paez suggests a sentientist approach: “Nature
is to be preserved for all sentient beings”. This seems consistent with Correia Caeiro’s
argument that “not all living organisms should be considered as equal in JP’s courts,
otherwise we would have to include not only plants, but bacteria, mushrooms or amoebas,
which lack the biological structures for sentience.” Sentience (i.e., the capacity for feeling or
perceiving) is certainly important but we disagree with Paez that sentient organisms are “the
only kinds of individuals who have moral claims and to whom we can owe moral obligations”.
Sentience plays a role in many other capacities and relationships (e.g. cognition,
communication and sociality). Sentience also brings the experiences of other beings
sufficiently close to our own to be a powerful basis for morality through, for example, the
deployment of ‘the Golden Rule’ – ‘treat others as you would wish them to treat you’
(Midgley, 1998, p. 91). So, of course, we agree with Franks et al. that sentience is critical for
moral consideration and that sentient organisms are owed respect (see Santiago-Ávila &
Lynn 2020).
However, although critical, we do not see the focus on, or the study of, animals’
sentience as the salvation of nonhuman animals, as suggested by Dulany. Sentience cannot
be the sole or most important basis for morality. Nonhumans classified as nonsentient,
including communities, may have further capacities or traits that are relevant to moral
consideration such as the relationships they are embedded in (Warren, 1990) or wanting to
continue living. This focus on sentience seems to suffer from the same individualist and
arguably anthropocentric metaphysical trap(s) previously discussed for individualism. We
caution against making such dichotomies as non/sentience, individualism/collectivism or
any other particular capability or relationship the arbiter of consideration in the mixedmoral community. Such hierarchical dichotomies tend to exclude, rather than be attentive to
situatedness. This is evidenced by the resulting value hierarchies in a number of dichotomies
in nature ethics and philosophy, such as: mind-body, human-animal, nature-culture, reasonemotion (see Warren, 1987, 1993; Taylor, 2014; Plumwood, 2000; Kheel, 1980; Toulmin
1992. By situatedness, we mean, following Warren (1990, p. 130): “a way of conceiving of
ethics and ethical meaning as emerging out of particular situations moral agents find
themselves in, rather than as being imposed on those situations (e.g., as a derivation or
instantiation of some pre-determined abstract principle or rule)” (emphasis ours), such that
“…ethical discourse can be held accountable to the historical, material and social realities in
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which moral subjects find themselves.” To reiterate, our reality is not limited to interactions
between individuals or sentient beings; we are just as much parts of the whole, so the fate of
even insentient wholes “cannot be a matter of moral indifference to us.” (Midgley, 1998 p.
91).
We agree with Franks et al. that science and scientists should take the interests of
nonhuman animals explicitly into account in all interventions into their lives, rather than
assuming a so-called “value neutral” stance in human-nonhuman conflicts that may reinforce
anthropocentric biases (Treves & Santiago-Ávila 2020). For example, interventions into the
lives of wolves in the US do not consider the well-being of wolves or wolf society; they instead
limit themselves to reducing conflicts for humans through whatever means are most
practical and effective (Santiago-Ávila et al 2018). Understanding animals as not only
sentient, but as interrelated beings is part of fulfilling our social and ecological duties to them
(see Warren, 1990; Midgley 1998, 2001; Donaldson & Kymlicka, 2011; Deckha 2015).
JP’s focus on individual animals stems from our view that much more progress should
already have been made in remedying the habitual dismissal of individuals in conservation
given what we already know about animal’s relationships, traits, inner lives, preferences and
interests. We join many others in implicating anthropocentrism (e.g., Calarco 2011, 2014;
Kopnina et al. 2018; Kopnina), including the focus on sentience, as a major reason for this
dismissal of individuals, because it considers animals only to the extent they are like us, and
neglects what is unlike us or unknowable (Castello, 2022). Thus, while it may be helpful for
building public support to raise awareness of such anthropocentric traits in some species to
gain public support for their wellbeing, as suggested by Howard & Dyer, it should come with
an understanding that this is not all that is of value.
Even if we cannot confirm whether plants or insects are sentient or we cannot know
what it feels like to be them, it does not follow that they matter less or that we can treat them
as instruments for sentient beings’ lives. Similarly, wholes are neglected to the extent that
they are categorized as insentient or lack anthropomorphic traits, which has led us to our
current predicament of “biological annihilation” (Ceballos et al., 2017). As Wienhues (2018)
notes, life itself has intrinsic value and it is intimately intertwined with some of these other
morally valuable qualities. Moreover, the metaphysical idea of separateness within
sentientist approaches remains problematic. The problem here may lie in the metaphysics
of “subjectivity” being limited to any one classification, such as the ‘human’, or the ‘animal’,
or the ‘sentient’, or even the ‘living’, when nothing should be categorically excluded (Derrida
1991, p. 106). On this point, we would do well to look to these other sources of knowledge
for insight (Franks et al.). In the meantime, we caution against considering a lack of
knowledge about the internal capabilities or phenomenology of life in other beings a
sufficient reason for moral dismissal.
Although we support equitable treatment of humans and non-humans, our account
of multispecies justice is not strictly egalitarian: “[R]ather than an abstract “fairness” or
“equality” of capabilities or opportunities, moral beings are owed equitable consideration of
their situated (i.e., contextual) similarities and differences (in capabilities, relationships,
needs, culpability and vulnerability)” (Santiago-Ávila & Lynn 2020). We share Wienhues's
concern about overstretching the concept of justice, but we do not think we do so in including
justice to communities, since we do so for human communities as well, as in the many
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historical and current movements for civil rights and justice for marginalized groups. We are
currently addressing this in other work that strives to promote both compassion and justice
towards individuals and communities (Santiago-Ávila et al., 2018; Lynn et al., 2019, 2020).
In this and further work, we emphasize the appropriate consideration of nonhumans.
The line drawn by Vucetich et al’s (2018) “non-anthropocentric” principle, which
“prioritizes human well-being” (p. 28). does not sound like equitable consideration of
nonhumans. The well-being of marginalized and vulnerable communities of humans and
nonhumans has higher urgency and salience, but human luxury should go to the end of the
queue (Wienhues); the burden of redistribution inherent in justice “has to be primarily
borne by the dominant or wealthy that occupy large amounts of ecological space” (Wienhues
2018). Without the explicit representation we propose, “we fear current human interests
and the frail political systems of our day may forever cave to immediate desires of insatiable
human users without thinking seven generations ahead as so many indigenous groups have
done for so long.” (JP p. 138-139)
We agree with Batavia’s emphasis on ecofeminism, relationships, and care as roots
of moral obligation. Situated ethics may accord priority to human over non-human interests
in specific cases; social psychology can play a role. Danielson & Vonasch emphasize the
importance of building trust on the basis of a shared identity, mediated by care and
compassion. Empathy helps reveal common ground and the need to minister to others’
suffering.
As Alexander points out, leveling the playing field between humans and non-humans
calls for greater inclusivity and representation. For just preservation to become a reality, we
cannot ignore inequities in gender, race, class, enablement and nature (to name a few) within
conservation science. We agree with Alexander that recognizing the viewpoints of women
amongst other marginalized groups would advance nature ethics (Kheel 1980; Warren
1990) and conservation along with it.
Finally, a word on the ‘nature ’of nature and our drive to intervene in it. Paez suggests
that our account of preservation ethics “seems to assume that nature does a good job of
promoting the interests of nonhuman sentients”. He points out that “nature itself… is likely
to be harmful overall for wild nonhuman animals, who constitute more than 99% of all
sentient beings,” concluding that “Nature is a moral catastrophe”.
We certainly share Paez’s concern about sentient beings and their anthropogenic
suffering in nature. Various other authors have raised these concerns, even arguing for
massive welfare interventions in nature against predation, disease or malnutrition (Horta,
2010; Horta, 2013), with some calling “for the gradual supplanting of the natural by the just”
(Nussbaum, 2006, p. 400). However, one of the most powerful insights from ecology is that
nature is composed and regulated by trade-offs: Conditions of scarcity are ubiquitous, so life
requires the consumption of other life to flourish.
In discussing this trade-off, Lynn (1998) has suggested that natural processes causing
suffering and mortality to individual organisms need not be moral catastrophes, despite the
resulting suffering and loss of lives. Rather, such “sad goods” are “a dynamic and
indispensable part of nature” (Lynn, 2012, p. 39) making possible the survival and well-being
of other organisms and their ecological communities. This trade-off does not seem to be
acknowledged in Horta’s and Paez’s proposals for massive intervention in nature. It is not
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that we should never intervene in nature. There may be ways we can improve the well-being
of many nonhuman lives, particularly through mitigating anthropogenic harms. However,
trying to mitigate non-anthropogenic harms at massive scales would inevitably imply
ecological trade-offs with the survival and well-being of other organisms (predators and
prey, for example). This is why, instead of massive human interventions in nature, we
advocate equitable consideration of nonhuman and futurity interests in human decisions
and actions about the human use and preservation of nature.
It is very difficult to decide how to intervene in conflicts of interest in nonhuman
nature without the contextual details, but this may not be the proper starting point. The first
question should be whether we should intervene in these non-anthropogenic processes in
the first place. (Dowe & Chmait’s views about the potential role of Artificial Intelligence
modelling in reconstructing nature for some species might be relevant here.) To assume that
we have the right to intervene is to assume human sovereignty over animals, as discussed
by Wadiwel (2015).
We agree with Midgley (1995, p. 348), who suggests that it may be more compatible
with our human nature to desist from attempts to control nature and let the beings in it
continue to exercise their own agency and autonomy: “We are receptive, imaginative beings,
adapted to celebrate and rejoice in the existence, quite independent of ourselves, of the other
beings on this planet.” Nature’s autonomy may be the precursor to the sense of wonderment
that inspires our cultural achievements: “We need the vast world, and it must be a world that
does not need us; a world constantly capable of surprising us, a world we did not program,
since only such a world is the proper object of wonder… [that] sense of otherness, is one of
the sources of religion (not the other way around), but it is also the source of curiosity and
every vigorous use of our faculties, and an essential condition of our sanity.” (ibid, p. 348).
Acknowledgements: We would like to thank Pablo P. Castello for his very thorough and thoughtful
feedback and suggestions, which greatly improved sections of the manuscript.
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